INTRODUCTION
Despite over half a century of intensive research the essential nature of the schizo phrenias still remains an enigma. Attempts to account for the disordered behaviour of the schizophrenic have ranged over the full spec trum of the biosocial sciences, explanations being sought both in the biochemistry of the organism and in the interpersonal @e1ationships of the whole individual. Sitting somewhere between these two extremes is the psychophysiological view. As a conceptual and methodological approach to behaviour in general, psycho physiology concerns itself with the problem of integrating neurophysiological and psycho logical data, attempting to bridge the gap be tween these two disciplines. Of course, the potential value of describing behaviour at a different level of explanation, either more molecular or more molar, is not denied. How ever, the peculiar contribution of psycho physiology is its concentration on data gathered at the interface between the brain and be haviour. As such its techniques are chosen so as to allow guesses to be made about the functional systems in the brain that underly behaviour. They naturally include the study of E.E.G. and autonomic response but also extend to the measurement of various phenomena derived from conventional experimental psy chology, such as perceptual thresholds and vigilance (Claridge, Ig7ob) . The theoretical concepts of psychophysiology reflect its mongrel background and include such terms as â€˜¿ arousal', a notion originating in academic psychology, but made respectable by neurophysiologists.
For the psychophysiologist the problem of understanding the psychiatric disorders can be formulated as the special problem of under standing individual differences in the activity of those neural mechanisms that underly be haviour in general. Thus, individual differences in anxiety-proneness may be viewed and measured as variations in central nervous activa tion or arousability (Duffy, 1962; Malmo, 1957) . Furthermore, it is usually assumed that the pathological states found among psychiatric patients are simple extensions of those processes responsible for the biological basis of normal personality. The latter view owes a great deal to the dimensional theory of personality deve loped by Eysenck (i@@7; I957b), particularly his attempt to anchor the major personality dimensions to their physiological substrate. Eysenck's theory was, in its turn, originally derived from the Russian notion of â€˜¿ nervous typology', an approach to temperamental varia tion pioneered by Pavlov, and in recent Soviet research applied to human personality differ ences by Teplov and his followers (Gray, 1964) . The Russian version of nervous type theory has traditionally been couched in language un familiar to the Western reader, using such terms as â€˜¿ strength of nervous system' and â€˜¿ stimulus in dynamism'. However, Gray (op. cit., 1967) has argued convincingly for the equivalence of Russian and Western ideas, an integration of the two also being evident in recent translations of Eysenck's original excitation-inhibition theory into the terminology of an arousal model of individual differences (Claridge, 1967; Eysenck, 1967 ).
Whether or not particular research has been carried out within the Eysenckian framework, the most successful application of psycho physiology to abnormal personality has occurred with respect to the neurotic disorders. Thus, a number of writers have provided evidence of greater autonomic arousal in neurotic patients with anxiety (Lader and Wing, 1964; Kelly, 1966) , a finding according well with the predic tions of early activation theorists like Duffy shown clear differences between defined groups of dysthymics and hysterico-psychopaths on a variety of measures, both physiological and experimental psychological (Claridge, 1967) .
To date less progress has been made in attempts to understand the functional psychoses as psychophysiological disorders having a di mensional basis comparable to the neuroses. There are perhaps two main reasons. The first is that â€˜¿ disease' views of these conditions still prevail, despite the continued failure to estab lish a discrete organic basis for their aetiology. The second is that even those adopting a dimensional position have found it difficult to devise adequate theoretical models to account for psychotic disorders, which, compared with the neuroses, must be psychophysiologically much more complex. Nevertheless, despite the immature nature of existing theorizing in the field, a psychophysiological/dimensional ex planation of the functional psychoses seems to hold promise. In any event, it is the main purpose of this paper to argue for the value of such an approach.
In doing so some reference will be made to the contribution of work on drug-induced model psychoses. This is partly because of its obvious relevance to the problem under discussion, but mainly to illustrate, in a climate of disillusion ment about psychotomimetic drug research, how it may still further our understanding of the natural psychoses if carried out from a well defined theoretical viewpoint.
Drug techniques have an important place in psychophysiological research because they allow the experimenter to test out hypotheses about the neural mechanisms underlying behaviour by manipulating them pharmacologically (Claridge, 1970a) . As far as individual varia tions are concerned, Russian workers have traditionally used drugs to establish nervous typological differences in animals and men; a research strategy formally recognized in the West by Eysenck, whose original theory con tained an explicit postulate linking personality to psychotropic drug effects (Eysenck, 1957a) . In the abnormal field, it is again the neuroses that have yielded the most promising results so far. Indeed, arousal models of neurotic per sonality differences have rested very heavily on the psychopharmacological approach; as wit nessed, for example, by work on the â€˜¿ sedation threshold' and similar drug techniques (Shagass and Jones, 1958; Claridge and Herrington, 1960) .
Comparable resÃ §@rch on the psychoses has been less successfiÃ£L' The main reason is similar to that which eiplains the general lack of progress in understanding the psychoses: namely a greater difficulty in conceptualizing the psychophysiological effects of those drugs the psychotomimeticsâ€"which come closest to simulating the natural state. Thus, it is rela lively easy in the case of, say, ordinary sedative/ hypnotics to provide a conceptual model which can explain both their general effects on be haviour and the nervous typological differences observed in responsÃ §to such drugs. The psycho tomimetics, on the other hand, clearly have a much more intricate action on the central nervous system, making them complicated psychopharmacological tools with which to work. It is therefore particularly difficult to think of a theoretical model in which the drug induced and naturally occurring states can be matched together.
Past attempts to do so have, like studies of the schizophrenias themselves, been concentrated at two extremes. On the one hand, drugs like LSD-25 were investigated, at the peak of interest in them, from a purely chemical viewpoint in the hope, so far unsubstantiated, that the â€˜¿ cause' of schizophrenia could be chased down to the biochemistry of the brain. On the other hand, attention was focussed on the subjective, experiential effects of the psyche delics, a fascinating exercise but one limited in the scientific data it can yield. Few systematic studies have been carried out within the kind of psychophysiological framework argued for here. In the meantime the hallucinogens have become a social problem, and behavioural scientists have become wary of giving them experi mentally to human subjects. It is hoped that this paper will help the reader to re-evaluate their place in research on the nature of the schizophrenias.
As implied earlier, the approach to schizo phrenic behaviour adopted here contains two assumptions. One is that the functional psy choses are not qualitatively distinct illnesses but represent the end-points of personality charac teristics running through the general popula tion. In this respect they are considered to be entirely similar to the neuroses. The second assumption is that, like other personality characteristics, the tendency to schizophrenic breakdown has, underlying it, certain definable psychophysiological processes; or, put another way, it represents a particular kind of nervous typological organization.
Each of these two points will be considered further in more detail.
ILLNESSOR Dn@NsIoN?
While it is not difficult to understand how, in the early days of their description, the schizo phrenias came to be regarded as qualitatively distinct diseases, what is surprising is that such a view continues to be so widely held. Indeed, to some not schooled to think in terms of the medical model, the most striking fact is the intellectual contortion required to maintain the disease position in the fact of mounting evidence to the contrary. The evidence itself comes from various sources. The first is of a clinical, diag nostic kind. For example, the major British textbook of psychiatry (Slater and Roth, 1969) opens its long account of the schizophrenias by pointing to the difficulties of actually defining the boundaries of these disorders. The problem was recognized by early observers, such as Bleuler @igii) and Kretschmer (1927) and is a still familiar one to most clinicians. Depending on the criteria adopted in a particular clinic, a proportion of patients can always be found whose symptoms are either not numerous or severe enough for them to be placed in anything other than an indeterminate category. In other words, they show all the signs of falling on a continuum somewhere between â€˜¿ normality' and severe disorder. Such patients have been variously described as â€˜¿ atypical', â€˜¿ schizophreni form', â€˜¿ latent', â€˜¿ schizoaifective', â€˜¿ pre-psychotic', â€˜¿ schizoid', â€˜¿ pseudoneurotic schizophrenic', â€˜¿ bor derline' . . . The list is endless, and while presumably aimed at preserving the disease model actually does much to undermine it.
The problem of defining the schizophrenias is not one that is solely confined to the appraisal of patients referred for psychiatric diagnosis. It may actually be difficult, if not impossible, to decide where the normal merges into the pathological. Individually, all of the behaviours found in the psychotic patient may occur in the so-called â€˜¿ normal' personâ€"and can do so to a varying degree. Thinking and language perhaps provide the best examples. Weird ideas that may be regarded as schizophrenic delusions in one context may be considered mere irrational beliefs in another, even though both may be equally bizarre and be held with equal tenacity. By the same token, the styles of expression said to characterize schizophrenic communication, both written and spoken, are frequently and increasingly found in socially acceptable art forms. Furthermore, the borders between the eccentric and the psychotic become harder to define as society adopts more flexible standards of conventional behaviour. Indeed, in some subcultures the previously conventional has already become the eccentric.
This view of the schizophrenias is also firmly supported by a wide range of evidence from scientific studies of these conditions. Over the years many hundreds of measurements of different kindsâ€"biochemical, physiological, and psychologicalâ€"have been taken on schizo phrenic patients. To the writer's knowledge in no case has the distribution of scores indicated a clear qualitative difference between schizo phrenics and other groups. Instead, schizo phrenics fall on a graded continuum with normals, occupying an extreme position, either at one pole of the continuum or spanning a general population average. The latter finding, of greater heterogeneity or variance, is, as Kety (1960) has pointed out, one of the few consistent facts about schizophrenia. Eysenck (1960) in particular has argued forcibly in favour of the dimensional hypo thesis, and in a series of studies with his colleagues has made a direct statistical attack on the problem. The earliest studies, based on the factor analysis of psychiatric ratings (Trou ton and Maxwell, 1956) (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1968) . Another important source of evidence comes from the field of genetics, an area well-trodden by those searching for a biological solution to the psychoses. Although many genetic models have been proposed these have required con siderable straining of classical Mendelian principles in order to maintain the assumption that what is to be explained is the transmission of a qualitatively distinct disease or group of diseases. In fact, it is becoming increasingly obvious that a limited gene hypothesis is inadequate to explain all of the facts about the schizophrenias. A much more plausible one is a polygenic theory which assumes that individuals inherit varying degrees of predisposition to schizophrenic breakdown, in much the same way as they inherit the tendency to neurotic reactions. Two eminent workers in the field, Gottesman and Shields (ig68), have put forward convincing arguments, based on schizophrenic twin research, in favour of this point of view. They quote two kinds of evidence. One is the tendency for the concordance rates of schizo phrenia in monozygotic twins to increase significantly as a function of severity of the psychotic reaction, a finding predictable from the polygenic model since the greater the genetic loading the less environmental factors would lead to discordance and vice versa. The second kind of evidence is derived from psycho metric studies of twins concordant and dis cordant for the diagnosis of schizophrenia. Using the MMPI, Gottesman and Shields demonstrated similarities in the personality profiles of MZ probands and their co-twins. Where the latter were not themselves psychi atrically ill the individual scale scores were less abnormal, but the similarity in profile shape was retained, with a high point on Schizo phrenia (Sc). The authors concluded, some what optimistically it is felt, that scores derived from the MMPI might be used to delineate the personality structure of individuals with a strong genetic predisposition to react to stress with a schizophrenic breakdown.
A further line of reasoning, also from the field of genetics, is contained in arguments that have been put forward to account for certain paradoxical facts about the manifestation rate of schizophrenia in the population. Given the reduced fertility of the schizophrenic patient, and without accepting an excessively high mutation rate, which is extremely unlikely, it is difficult to explain why the condition remains so common. One explanation is that proposed by Huxley et al. (1964) , who suggested that the schizophrenic genotype may carry with it certain biological advantages, perhaps reflected in an increased immunity among schizophrenics and their relatives. Support for this theory has recently been obtained by Carter and Watts (â€˜97'), who demonstrated a significantly re duced incidence of accidents and viral infections in schizophrenics' relatives.
The picture that begins to emerge, therefore, is of schizophrenic predisposition as a con tinuously variable personality dimension in herited as a set of polygenically determined characteristics which are maintained at an adequate level in the population through selective genetic control. This notion is not incompatible with the fact that extreme loading on such a dimension may lead to the severely disturbed behaviour that is currently identified as schizophrenic â€˜¿ illness'. A similar situation exists in the case of other psychiatric disorders. Neurotic anxiety is a good example. Very high (or very low) degrees of anxiety can result in grossly maladaptive behaviour, sometimes as mentally crippling or socially undesirable as that found among psychotic patients. Yet variations in anxiety-proneness are an accepted part of normal personality differences. Further more, despite its ability to disrupt behaviour, anxiety serves a useful biological purpose; for as the Yerkes-Dodson principle illustrates, it is only at optimally moderate levels of anxiety that efficient psychological performance can occur (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908) .
Given that schizophrenic predisposition can be viewed in a similar way, the question that remains is: What psychological characteristics have the biological utility to form a major parameter of personality yet show continuity between normal adaptive behaviour and dis ruptive mental disorder? The most commonly held opinion, and the one for which the strongest arguments can be advanced, is that the charac teristics in question have something to do with the cognitive and selective attentional aspects of behaviour, seen at the psychological level as styles of thinking in the normal individual and as thought disorder in the schizophrenic patient. Like anxiety, such behaviour clearly had im portant survival value during the evolution of man, though, again like anxiety, perhaps only at certain optimum levels.
The notion of an alliance between great wits and madness, to paraphrase Dryden, is not a new one, and observations of schizophrenic thinking and life styles in the writings and personalities of famous creators in the arts and sciences are too familiar and well-documented for the point to be laboured further here. More recent formal studies of the problem are of interest, however. For present purposes these can be considered as falling into two main groups.
The first kind of study has been concerned with the relationship between creativity and personality traits in psychiatrically normal individuals. Before considering this evidence, it is first necessary to comment briefly on the status of creativity as a topic in general psy chology. The psychometric analysis of creativity has given rise to a vast literature, and, while opinions differ on whether it can be considered entirely independent of general intelligence as normally defined, a valid distinction can be made between the divergent modes of thinking required to solve problems of an â€˜¿ open-ended' kind and the convergent thinking style tapped by conventional intelligence tests (Butcher, ig68) . As a recognizable feature of cognitive functioning, creativity can be variously de scribed as the ability to take conceptual leaps in the face of minimal information, the ability to see remote connections between apparently unrelated items, and the ability to retain a flexible approach to problem-solving in order to seek a solution whether one is possible or not. A number of studies have examined the per sonality profiles of individuals judged to be high in creative talent, both in the arts and sciences. Most of these investigations agree that such people do differ in certain important respects from the general population. McKinnon (1962) , using the MMPI with a group of architects, found that scores on all of the scales of that test were elevated to a varying degree, with a small but positive correlation between rated creativity and Schizophrenia (Sc). He concluded that the results were indicative of greater unusualness of thought processes and a freer expression of impulse and imagery in his subjects. Several other similar studies have made use of the Cattell i6 Personality Factor questionnaire. Cattell and Butcher (1968), and Cattell and Drevdahl (1955) , reporting on a group of eminent research scientists, described them as significantly sizothymic (withdrawn), emotionally unstable, self-sufficient, and bo hemian. Some of these traits were also found by Drevdahl (1956) to differentiate creative and non-creative students. In a more recent investi gation, Cross et al. (1967) , also using the i6PF, dearly differentiated artists from a matched control group on a number of traits. Artists were found to be low in emotional stability and super-ego strength and especially high in autistic or bohemian tendency.
In some respects the personality traits found by i6PF users to characterize the creative thinker are very similar to those shown to be abnormal in psychotic patients. Thus, McAllister (1968) , using Foulds' system of dassifying psychiatric illness, reported that non-integrated psychotics, and to a lesser degree integrated psychotics, deviated markedly from average in sizothymia and autistic tendency.
In other respects, however, the profiles of creative thinkers and diagnosed schizophremcs differ noticeably from each other. That is particularly true of Cattell's second fkctor, Intelligence, on which schizophrenics score very poorly but on which creative thinkers are universally high. This finding accords well with the condusion reached by most workers who have examined the trait characteristics of creative thinkers; namely, that while such people emerge as unusual individuals they almost always show the strong intellectual and emotional controls indicative of the integrated. personality. Never theless, it is of interest that the traits on which the creative thinker does appear to deviate from average are precisely those which, within the range of normal variation, may reflect an increased loading on an underlying personality factor associated with schizophrenia. The second group of studies providing evi dence for a continuity between normal and pathological thinking has focussed on thought disorder itself. The rationale for their inclusion here is the apparent resemblance between the cognitive style that characterizes the creative process and schizophrenic loosening of ideational boundaries, a disorder most commonly investi gated recently under the heading of â€˜¿ over inclusion' (Payne and Hewlett, 1960 ), but a classically described feature of schizophrenia (Bleuler, op. cit.) . It scarcely requires a con ceptual leap to see the schizophrenic's tendency to follow irrelevant themes in his stream of thought as an extreme example of divergent thinking, the main difference being that in one case it is an uncontrolled activity and in the other a rationally directed one.
Experimental support for this hypothesis comes from a series of studies that have examined psychiatrically well individuals for evidence of deviant performance on tests specifically de signed to measure thought disorder in psychotic patients. Most studies in this area have used the research strategy of looking at thought disorder test performance in individuals who are con sidered genetically predisposed to schizophrenia. Thus, in an early investigation Rapaport (i@@) demonstrated that loosened thinking, as mea sured by an object sorting test, was characteristic of pre-schizophrenic patients and non-psychiatric subjects judged to be of schizoid personality. Subsequent investigators have narrowed down on those individuals whose predisposition to psychosis can be presumed from the fact that they have a schizophrenic relative. Romney (1969) obtaining similar results, which while not quite statistically significant on a small sample were in the predicted direction. Some further confirmatory evidence comes from Mednick's ongoing follow-up study in Denmark of children of schizophrenic mothers (Mednick and Schulsinger, 1968) . Compared with matched control subjects these â€˜¿ high-risk' children have already proved to have loosened thinking and a high frequency of idiosyncratic responses on continuous association tests.
Other work of a slightly different kind has shown that it is not necessary deliberately to select individuals according to their genetic predisposition in order to demonstrate unusual thinking styles on thought disorder tests. Thus, a colleague of the present author, using the Object Classification Test (Payne, 1962) , showed that creative artists tended to produce a high number of unusual sortings, indicative of over inclusion, and as a group fell midway between schizophrenic patients and unselected control subjects (Canter, unpublished study). Finally, McConaghy and Clancy (1968) examined allusive thinking with the Object Sorting Test in a group of normal university students and their parents. They found a significant tendency for students with high scores on the test to have a high-scoring parent. In their paper McConaghy and his colleagues made similar points to those being argued here, namely that modes of abstraction seen in psychosis are also found generally in the population, that these may be characteristic of creative thinking, and that, as such, they may reflect part of the biological advantage of the schizophrenic genotype.
In arguing here for a dimensional view of the schizophrenias many gaps have clearly been left unfilled. Lack of space, of available evidence, and of creativity on the part of the writer preclude detailed analysis of the questions that remain. However, some of the main points arising from the above discussion merit brief comment. The most important questions con cern the heterogeneity observed within the clinically diagnosable schizophrenias. Thus, in arguing for a similarity between overinclusion and certain aspects of the creative process, no account has been taken of the fact that not all schizophrenics show thought disorder of an overinclusive kind. Some demonstrate the oppositeâ€"overexclusion.
In fact, if a dimen sional view of the problem is taken some of these difficulties can be resolved, at least in principle. Thus, simultaneous variations along other personality and cognitive dimensions could adequately account for differences in the way schizophrenic reactions manifest themselves. In this respect there is already some evidence (Claridge, 1967 ) that introversion-extraversion may be an important dimension differentiating individuals prone to particular kinds of schizo phrenic reaction. At a cognitive level it is feasible that the predisposition to schizophrenia actually reflects a dimension ranging from overexciusion to overinclusion, its biological advantage lying in genetic selection for some optimal inter mediate value.
Other more difficult problems arise from the possibility that the dimensions making up the personality may have an interacting effect on behaviour. One consequence of such an inter action is that it may itself determine an indi vidual's predisposition to schizophrenic break down. Quite apart from exogenous factors, such as environmental stress or upbringing, it seems likely that, even given a high predisposition to schizophrenia, actual breakdown may occur only if the loading on some other dimension, or dimensions, has a critical value. The point is well-illustrated by the evidence already reviewed on the differences in intelligence that are found when schizophrenic patients and creative individuals are compared. Thus, it may be that the very creative person, though highly pre disposed to schizophrenia, does not become @â€"¿ @clinically psychotic because high general intelli gence confers some immunity in the form of adequate intellectual and personality reserves. Or, put the other way round, the absence of such reserves may make the psychotically pre disposed individual more vulnerable to stress. In the event of breakdown the same kind of interaction may also determine its severity, nature, and course. For example, two equally predisposed individuals may react in different ways depending on their intellectual level. This may be particularly true of the kind of thought disorder they show, since the latter is almost certainly determined, not only by the specific cognitive styles thought to be associated with the schizophrenias, but also by general intelli gence. In this respect it is worth noting that there is evidence for differences in the intellectual levels of various subtypes of schizophrenia even before breakdown (Mason, 1956) .
The above considerations clearly illustrate how, even assuming a view of the schizophremas taken here, the problem is an extremely difficult one to disentangle. However, the present dis cussion has served to outline the broad principles of the dimensional approach prior to a con sideration of its nervous typological aspects, a quesion taken up in the next section.
Tii@ NERVOUS TYPOLOGICAL MODEL
Given a â€˜¿ normal variant' view of schizo phrenia, its behavioural analysis can, of course, be undertaken at any level of description biochemical, psychophysiological, or social/ psychological.
However, the psychophysio logical approach has certain advantages, already outlined, and the remainder of this paper will discuss the schizophrenias and schizophrenic predisposition within the framework of the nervous typological theory of personality. As already stated previously, the general assump lion of this theory is that, at a biological level, differences in personality depend upon varia tions in the organization of central nervous processes.
The germ of a nervous typological description of the schizophrenias was contained in some of Pavlov's own speculations about their patho genesis, his suggestion being that different kinds of psychotic reaction depend upon abnormal weakening or strengthening of the cortical inhibitory processes (Ivanov-Smolensky, â€˜¿ 9@). More recently, Eysenck (1961), in a short-lived attempt to account for the genotypic basis of psychotic behaviour, also made use of inhibition as an explanatory concept, hypothesizing that the main characteristic of schizophrenia was the abnormally slow rate at which reactive inhibi tion is dissipated. However, this hypothesis has proved to have little generality beyond the particular empirical data upon which it was formulated, namely pursuit-rotor reminiscence scores (Claridge, 1960; Broadhurst and Broad hurst, 1964) .
Other contemporary theorists seeking a single psychophysiological concept to explain the schizophrenias have chosen that of arousal. It can be stated at the outset that in their most basic formâ€"that schizophrenia is a state of heightened (Fish, ig6i) or diminished (Wecko.. wicz, 1958) arousalâ€"such models have, like Eysenck's reactive inhibition hypothesis, proved far too simplistic. Apart from contradicting one another, they fail to give any account either of the heterogeneity of the schizophrenias or of the obviously extensive involvement of all aspects of psychological function in psychotic disorder. Put more concretely, they do not even get beyond the first stage of explaining why it is that neurotics, also in varying states of arousal, are not psychotic! More sophisticated theorizing and method ology, however, have helped to sustain models of schizophrenia that incorporate the notion of arousal, two developments in the field being of particular interest. One has been the careful examination of arousal variations within groups of schizophrenic patients. Thus, Venables and his colleagues have shown relationships between arousal level and narrowly defined charac teristics of schizophrenia, such as behavioural withdrawal and paranoid-non-paranoid symp tomato@ogy (Venables and Wing, 1962; Venables, 1967) . Similarly Herrington and Claridge (1965) , finding a wide range of arousability in early psychosis, were able to demonstrate that differences in psychophysio logical status were associated with such clinical features as thought disorder and mood disturbance.
The second and perhaps more interesting development has been the demonstration that schizophrenic patients differ from others, not so much in their absolute levels on given psychophysiological measures, but rather in the way in which different measures co-vary to gether; suggesting that it is the organization, not the deviation, of central nervous activity that is critically important in the schizophrenias. Empirically this difference in central organiza tion is reflected in the correlations between measures that are considered to tap important aspects of psychophysiological function. Thus, some years ago Herrington and Claridge (op. cit.) reported that the correlation between two such measuresâ€"the sedation threshold and the Archimedes spiral after-effectâ€"was significantly negative in early psychotics but significantly positive in neurotic patients; yet the range of scores on each measure taken individually was identical in both groups. Around the same time Venables (1963) described a similar reversal of correlation using two quite different measures, skin potential and the fusion threshold for paired light flashes (two-flash threshold). Comparing normal subjects and chronic schizophrenics, he found correlations of opposite sign in the two groups, the direction of the relationships indi cating that high autonomic activity was associated with poor perceptual discrimination in the former and heightened discrimination in the latter. Again both schizophrenics and normals spanned similar ranges on both measures.
The result for the sedation threshold and spiral after-effect was later confirmed by Krish namoorti and Shagass (1964), though Venables' finding has proved more difficult to replicate exactly. Lykken and Maley (1968) compared schizophrenic and non-psychotic patients on two perceptual measures, two-flash threshold and critical flicker fusion, and two autonomic indices, skin potential and skin conductance. They found that the perceptual and autonomic measures were certainly associated differently in the two groups, but that the pattern of correla tions was diametrically opposite to that reported by Venables. The Lykken and Maley result in non-psychotics confirmed those obtained in an earlier series of studies by the same group of authors (Lykken ci a!., 1966) and that reported by Hume and Claridge (1965) for normal subjects. To complicate matters further, Hume findings in schizophrenics but found zero correlations between two-flash threshold and skin potential in normal and neurotic subjects.
Some recent results from our own work, however, help to explain some of the differences between these various sets of data, as well as providing further clues about the possible The results in question come from a study of LSD response in normal volunteers carried out in our laboratory some years ago and reported briefly elsewhere (Claridge and Hume, ig66). The aim of the experiment was to set up a drug model of Venables' comparison of schizophrenic and normal subjects. It was predicted that the overall effect of LSD would be not so much to produce a change in arousal per se but rather to alter the co-variation between autonomic and perceptual function, as reflected in the correlation between skin potential and two-flash threshold. A recent re-analysis of the data from this experiment has unearthed some interesting relationships, shown in the accompanying figures, which bear out this prediction. It can be seen that when the placebo and LSD conditions are compared there is indeed a systematic association between two-flash threshold and skin potential, the relationships being curvilinear but of opposite direction under the two conditions. That for placebo (Fig. I) is of the more usual inverted-U type, perceptual discrimination improving up to an optimum level of Ã¡utonomic arousal and then deteriorating.
Under LSD (Fig. 2) , on the other hand, heightened perceptual sensitivity appears to occur when the concurrent level of arousal is either very high or very low, being poorest at a moderate arousal level. These results clearly help to account for the contradictory findings obtained in the group
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comparison studies described a moment ago. Thus, whether positive, negative, or zero correla tions appear in particular groups may depend critically on the range of arousal over which subjects are tested. The point is well illustrated in Fig. 3 , where the placebo and LSD data from Figs. i and 2, up to a skin potential level of 25 my., have been superimposed. It can be seen that the correlation between two-flash threshold and skin potential is significantly negative under LSD (â€"o @82, p < . oi), but significantly positive under placebo (+014, p < .oi). In the upper range of skin potential, however, the correlations, while much lower, are reversed in sign, now being positive for LSD (+Â°@i i) and negative for placebo (â€"o'32) .
This curious effect of LSD provides a remark able pharmacological parallel of the naturally occurring state. It is also of great interest because of the light it may throw on the psycho physiological basis of the drug's action and therefore perhaps of the naturally-occurring psychoses. A commonly held view of the latter is that they are characterized by a weakening of central nervous homeostasis, an explanation that could also account for the LSD effects just described. Thus, according to Russian nervous typological theory (Gray, 1964) , the deteriora tion in perceptual sensitivity found in our experiment at very high arousal levels in the placebo condition would be ascribed to the fact that homeostatic or â€˜¿ protective' inhibitory mechanisms begin to intervene once arousal reaches a critical level. Applying the same argument to the opposite function obtaining under LSD, it could be concluded that such mechanisms operate there in reverse leading, at high arousal levels, to inappropriately height ened sensitivity to the environment.
If, as Venables (1963) indeed argued, there is a similar weakening or failure of feedback mechanisms in natural psychosis, then physio logically this would represent a highly unstable state of affairs since marked changes in arousal in either direction could result in disproportionate alterations in perceptual sensitivity which would be very disruptive of mental function. Such a model might be ideally placed to account for many of the symptoms of the schizophrenic patient.
The notion of altered feedback was, in fact, implicitly incorporated in the present author's â€˜¿ dissociation' theory of schizophrenia proposed a few years ago (Claridge, 1967) and considered to account for the inverted relationships be tween sedation threshold and spiral after-effect observed in schizophrenic patients. The theory itself was actually based on a long series of psychophysiological studies of neurotic, normal, and psychotic subjects. This research, which included two factor analyses of some of the more important measures, demonstrated two recog nizable components of psychophysiological activity. One, clearly identifiable as a classic factor of arousal, as conventionally defined, accounted particularly for variations in auto nomic responsiveness and sedation threshold. The second was mainly associated with EEG., particularly alpha rhythm, variables which, in turn, were related to the spiral after-effect. This latter component was therefore regarded as having a partly inhibitory feedback function, being concerned with the modulation of sensory input into the nervous system and with the selectivity aspect of attention. The model pro posed that these two mechanisms are function ally related in the sense that variations in one are linked to variations in the other. The direction of this co-variation was considered to provide the nervous typological basis of the major neurotic and psychotic syndromes. One mode of co-variation was that postulated in neurotics and reflected empirically in the positive correlation between sedation threshold and spiral effect. There it was considered that the high levels of arousal (sedation threshold) found in dysthymic neurotics are associated with extreme selectivity or narrowing of attention, leading to prolonged spiral after-effects. The opposite would be true of hysterico-psycho pathic individuals. The model further proposed that the reverse situation could occur, namely that high levels of arousal could co-exist with poor modulation of sensory input and vice versa; thus leading to negative correlations between sedation threshold and spiral after-effect. It was this dissociation of psychophysiological function â€"¿ dissociation,at least, as judged against the neurosesâ€"that was considered characteristic of schizophrenic patients.
A further feature of this model was the proposal that the dissociation of function found in the schizophrenias could occur in one of two directions, leading to different clinical syndromes.
That conclusion was based on experimental evidence concerning the clinical and behavioural correlates of sedation threshold/ spiral after-effect variation. Thus, it was found that schizophrenics showing evidence of high arousal and poor selective attentionâ€"high sedation threshold/low spiral after-effectâ€"were more often paranoid, behaviourally active, emotionally reactive and, consistent with their weak attentional control, more overinclusive in their thought disorder. Those in the opposite psychophysiological stateâ€"poorly aroused (low sedation threshold) and with highly narrowed attention (high spiral after-effect)â€"tended to be retarded, affectively flattened, socially with drawn and, if thought-disordered, more often concrete and overexclusive.
There seems, therefore, to be mounting evidence which enables us to reach three minimum conclusions about the psychophysio logical basis of the schizophrenias.
First, the differences between the latter and other psychi atric disorders, as well as the reason for varia tions within the schizophrenic syndromes them selves, seem to lie in the way the central nervous system is organized rather than in any single disturbance of function. Secondly, two im portant processes involved seem to be those of arousal and attention. Thirdly, the organization of central nervous function in the schizophrenias â€"¿ as well as in other statesâ€"can be usefully examined by looking at the functional relation ships between carefully chosen measures of psychophysiological activity. This emphasis on organization, rather than deviation, has actually been neglected by most psychophysiologists working on the problem of individual differ ences; or, if recognized, it has been done so only implicitly. Such neglect is the more surprising in view of the fact that psychophysiology has itself nurturned at least two examples of such an approach to behavioural analysis. One is the well-studied inverted-U function relating arousal to psychological performance (Hebb, 1955) . The other is the â€˜¿ narrowed attention'
principle, namely the hypothesis put forward by a number of workers that the range of cues to which the individual responds diminishes as arousal rises and vice versa (Callaway and Dembo, 1958; Easterbrook, 1959) . It should not surprise us too much if we need to seek other functions to account for other forms of central nervous organization. Indeed, it is perhaps not coincidental that the two principles just quoted seem, if anything, to work in reverse in schizo phrenia. Given the value of the psychophysiological approach, a question that remains is whether the disturbances of function seen in schizo phrenic patients represent the nervous typo logical basis of a continuous personality dimen sion. Or, put another way, to what extent do the arguments presented in the previous section for a dimensional model of schizophrenia, find support in the psychophysiological evidence? At a purely theoretical level it is not difficult to visualize the cognitive styles, seen in the normal as creativity and in the schizophrenic as thought disorder, as having a common psycho physiological basis in the attentional control mechanisms of the central nervous system. Indeed, a number of workers concerned with trying to explain such phenomena as over inclusion have argued some of the links in this chain of reasoning (Payne, 1960; McGhie, 1969; Silverman, 1964 Silverman, , 1967 McConaghy, 1961) . Fur thermore, in formulating the dissociation theory of schizophrenia described above it was certainly our view that differences in the relative balance between the two mechanisms of arousal and input modulation accounted not only for the extreme reactions seen in psychiatric patients but also for normal personality variations. Thus, the kind of co-variation observed in the neuroses was considered to define a neuroticism dimen sion of dysthymia-hysteria, for which there was strong experimental evidence. It was also postulated, however, that cutting across this was a second dimension of â€˜¿ psychoticism' charac terized by relative imbalance between arousal and input modulation. The view that we were dealing with characteristics running through the general population was supported by the fact that only by selecting out psychiatrically defined criterion groups of psychotics and neurotics was it possible to demonstrate the reversals of corre lation between sedation threshold and spiral after-effect discussed earlier. In an unselected group of normal subjects the correlation be tween these measures was zero, suggesting that both kinds of co-variation between arousal and input modulation were represented. Further more, in those normal subjects whose sedation threshold/spiral after-effect performance re sembled that of diagnosed schizophrenics evi dence was found for unusual response patterns on thought disorder tests, even though such individuals were not overtly ill.
More recent work from our laboratory has extended these findings and provided further evidence for the dimensional/nervous typological model of schizophrenia. Thus, in one study, just completed, normal subjects were categorized according to their scores on Eysenck's new PEN personality questionnaire (Claridge and Chappa, to appear).
It has been found that certain individuals, including, significantly, those ob taining high scores on the P (psychoticism) scale of that inventory, show a pattern of psycho physiological response identical to that pre viously observed in schizophrenic patients.
Other evidence has come from several studies in which, using the author's personality theory as a starting-point, comparisons have been made of normal individuals, classified this time not on the basis of their personality inventory scores but on nervous typological grounds according to whether or not they showed a psychophysiological resemblance to schizo phrenic patients. A particularly convincing example of this strategy has been its application to the analysis of individual differences in the response of subjects taking part in the LSD experiment described earlier. There the subjects were divided according to whether the psycho physiological change they showed under LSD was or was not like that previously found in schizophrenics; the assumption, of course, being that the drug would exaggerate, or throw into relief, nervous typological differences in the predisposition to schizophrenia. The actual measures used to classify the subjects were chosen on the basis of our previous work as representative of the two psychophysiological systems discussed earlier, namely tonic arousal and input modulation. These were the rates of change (regression slopes) for heart rate and spiral after-effect, the former being chosen as a suitable equivalent of the sedation threshold.
The subjects were divided into two groups. The first consisted of those who showed a schizophrenic-like reaction to LSD, that is either an increase in heart rate accompanied by a decrease in spiral after-effect or a decrease in heart rate and an increase in after-effect; the second group consisted of those subjects showing the opposite combinations of change. ClassifIed in this way the ten subjects available divided equally into two groups of five indivi duals, referred to here as P-responders and NP-responders, respectively.
Comparison of these two groups revealed a number of important differences between them, both clinical and psychophysiological. After taking LSD each individual had been rated on a three-point scale for severity of reaction to the drug, this being done by an independent observer, a psychiatric colleague of the author. It was found subsequently that all five P responders had ratings of 3 (severe), while only one of the NP-responders was rated as having had a severe reaction; of the remaining four NP subjects two were given a rating of 2 (moderate) and two a rating of, (mild) Under dexamphetamine P-responders showed a significantly greater rise in skin potentialâ€"or increase in autonomic arousalâ€"than NP-responders (Mann-Whitney U Test, p < .07); while the groups also differed quite clearly in their change in spiral after-effect. As shown in Fig. 4 , the predominant tendency among P-responders was for the spiral after-effect to show a progressive increase under dexamphetamine, only one subject showing a fall. All of the NP-responders, on the other hand, reacted to the drug with a gradual drop in spiral after-effect. The difference between these two distributions was highly significant (Mann-Whitney U Test, p < .008). The results just described provide striking confirmation of the fact that if the problem is approached from a well-defined theoretical viewpoint
it is possible to demonstrate a continuity between the clinically observed psychoses and normal personality; thus adding evidence, at the nervous typological level, to that reviewed in the previous section. The difference in response, particularly clinical response, to LSD observed in our P and NP and â€˜¿ non-psychotic' responders to LSD-25. Note that P responders tend to show a predominant rise, and NP responders a predominant fall, in spiral after-effect with dexamphetamine.
responders suggests that the method of classify ing our subjects was a valid one and that we were indeed selecting out individuals who were, respectively, high and low on a personality dimension concerned with the predisposition to schizophrenia. From a psychophysiological point of view it is also of some interest that the response to dexamphetamine was also capable of bringing out differences between the groups, so offering further evidence of quite fundamental variations in the nervous typological organization under lying the personality dimension. Some implica tions of this latter finding will be discussed further below. DIscussIoN 
AND CoNcLusIoNs
The purpose of this paper has been to present the arguments in favour of a particular view of the schizophrenic disorders, namely one that tries to steer a path between conceptualizing them as either purely biochemical diseases or as entirely psychologically determined reactions. In arguing the case for a dimensional/nervous typological approach it has been necessary to range wide over a number of research areas which, directly or indirectly, can contribute to our understanding of the schizophrenias. Thus the dimensional view of these conditions rests heavily on facts both from genetics and from clinical and psychological studies of psychotic and normal behaviour. Furthermore, as befits the probable nature of schizophrenic nervous function, the psychophysiological evidence is complicated. However, some consistent trends are beginning to emerge and point to the schizophrenias as being intricate disorders of central nervous organization.
As such their explanation will demand the search for new principles of psychophysiological function, more complex than those that have sufficed so far in the field. Illustrating this point very well are the two examples quoted earlier, namely the inverted-U and narrowed attention principles often used as explanatory concepts in be havioural research. Neither of these principles seems capable of accounting for the psycho physiological relationships observed in the schizophrenic disorders and their pharmaco logical equivalent. Indeed, it begins to look as though it is their very failure to work, or even their tendency to work in reverse, that may explain the unusual central nervous organization associated with the schizophrenias and with the personality characteristics predisposing to them. Some emphasis has been placed here on the use of drug research strategies for exploring nervous typological variations. Past experience has suggested that such techniques are uniquely valuable for throwing into relief the psycho physiological concomitants of personality. If it is also a viable notion that the predisposition to schizophrenia represents a major dimension of personality, then it too should benefit from a combined nervous typological and psycho pharmacological attack. Of course, it could be, and is often, argued that the effects of the psychotomimetics do not resemble the natural psychoses sufficiently for their continued study to be worthwhile. However, this view is based on a misunderstanding of the logic of drug research in behavioural analysis. It is not to be expected that the model psychoses will exactly mimic the naturally occurring states (though actually they sometimes do so to a remarkable degree!); for the latter are complex disorders of the total personality, involving long-term psychological and behavioural adjustments and having central nervous factors only as their physiological substrate. It would be just as fallacious to argue that, because conventional sedatives and stimulants do not produce exact behavioural analogues of the psychoneuroses, such drugs are of little value in examining the psychophysiological basis of these conditions. As far as the psychotomimetics are concerned, there is considerable evidence, reviewed else where (Claridge, 1970a) , that drugs like LSD are of unique interest precisely because their curious effects on important processes like arousal and attention are so similar to those observed in schizophrenic patients. It is con sidered that the reason there have so far been few successful attempts to integrate facts about both within a single theoretical framework arises from the failure to recognize psychoto mimetic drug research as an exercise in nervous typological analysis, of the kind illustrated in this paper.
A more powerful argument against the con tinued use of psychomimetics is an ethical one.
Thus, it is unfortunate that those drugs which come closest to matching the naturally occurring psychoses are currently proscribed by society, leaving the genuine research worker in consider able doubt as to the ethics of administering substances like LSD even to volunteers under close supervision. However, it is possible that other, more acceptable, drugs could prove equally useful pharmacological tools for examining the nervous typological basis of the schizophrenias. The results reported here would suggest that dexamphetamine merits further investigation from this point of view.
A practical and not too fanciful consequence of such research might be the development of a pharmacological procedure for detecting individuals highly predisposed to schizophrenic breakdown. The need for, and feasibility of, such a development is supported by the view of Gottesman and Shields (op. cit.), who, concluding their discussion of the probable polygenic basis of schizophrenic inheritance and noting its close similarity to diabetes millitus as a threshold characteristic, make a plea for a diagnostic instrument with the power of the glucose tolerance test. Sedman and Kenna (1965) , who found that sensitive, schizoid personalities showed a more pathological re sponse to LSD, considered that that drug might serve such a purpose. In view of what has been said, it is possible that dexamphetamine could prove to be a more acceptable and practical alternative.
If a single conclusion had to be reached from the evidence reviewed here it would be that a sudden breakthrough in establishing the â€˜¿ causes' of the scbizophrenias now seems unlikely.
Instead it looks as though the understanding of them will come slowly through careful dissection of those aspects of normal behaviour which in exaggerated form present as the schizophrenic Starting from this dimensional view it is further argued that the predisposition to schizophrenia, like other personality dimensions, has a dis coverable psychophysiological basis, in the form of a particular kind of nervous typological organization.
The two most important processes involved seem to be those of arousal and atten tion, and evidence is reviewed in support of the author's theory that it is the manner in which these two processes co-vary that is uniquely different in schizophrenics and in normal individuals highly predisposed to schizophrenia.
The special importance of drug techniques as nervous typological tools is emphasized and illustrated with some recent experimental find ings on LSD-25. It is concluded that research such as that described may eventually lead to the development of pharmacological procedures which can identify individuals who are psycho physiologically predisposed to schizophrenic breakdown under stress.
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